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GOVERNMENT COMPULSION OF CORPORATE
SPEECH: LEGITIMATE REGULATION OR FIRST
AMENDMENT VIOLATION? A CRITIQUE OF PG&E
v. Public Utilities Commission
Mitchell C. Tilner*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
(PG &E),1 five members of the Supreme Court held that the first
amendment' prohibits a state from compelling a privately owned,
state regulated, utility company from including inserts in the com-
pany's billing envelopes which express views contrary to those of the
company.' Although five Supreme Court Justices agreed on the out-
come of the case, only four members of the Court managed to agree
upon a rationale for the prohibition.4
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1. 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986).
2. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
3. The Court had previously held that the first amendment prohibits a state from sup-
pressing political inserts prepared by the utility itself. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980). The Court in Consolidated Edison expressly declined to
decide whether the state could constitutionally compel the utility to permit groups with oppos-
ing views to enclose their own inserts in the billing envelopes. Id. at 543 n.13. Cf. Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC-mandated right-of-reply as
applied to broadcast media). The PG&E case, thus, raised the question left open in Consoli-
dated Edison. But see infra note 18. For an argument that the first amendment mandates a
right to reply to political opinions expressed by state-created monopolies in their billing
envelopes, see Comment, Public Utility Bill Inserts, Political Speech, and the First Amend-
ment: A Constitutionally Mandated Right to Reply, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1221 (1982). For
other discussions of the PG&E case, see Harpaz, Justice Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy: The
Supreme Court Struggles to Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV. 817, 891-
902 (1986); Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1, 182-90
(1986).
4. Justice Powell authored the plurality opinion, in which Justices O'Connor and
Brennan joined. The plurality reasoned that the state's order triggered first amendment analy-
sis because the order: (1) compelled the utility to associate with and, in effect, to respond to
views disagreeable to it; and (2) threatened to inhibit the utility's own speech, thereby reducing
the flow of information from the utility to the public. See infra notes 17-29 and accompanying
text. Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring opinion expressing the view that the fact of com-
pulsory association alone warranted first amendment analysis and invalidation of the state's
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This article argues that the plurality's reasoning and result
were fatally flawed for two reasons. First, the plurality mistakenly
assumed that corporate entities enjoy "freedom of mind" that merits
protection under the first amendment. Such an assumption finds no
support either in reason or in the authorities.5 Second, the plurality
failed to explain adequately how the regulation at issue would result
in suppression of the corporation's own speech. Accordingly, the
plurality's application of strict first amendment standards to the reg-
ulation was unjustified. The regulation should have been analyzed
under the more lenient "rational basis" standard that governs rou-
tine regulation of corporate conduct.
In Part II below, this article summarizes the PG&E case by
describing the pertinent facts (Part II (A)) and the plurality's ration-
ale (Part 11 (B)). Part III, which is divided into five sections, cri-
tiques the plurality opinion. Part III(A) summarizes the critique.
Part III(B) addresses the fundamental, conceptual flaw in the plu-
rality's analysis - the plurality's presupposition that corporations
enjoy a "freedom of mind" of the kind previously recognized by the
Court only in cases involving state compulsion of speech by individu-
als. This article demonstrates that the precedents cited by the plural-
ity for the proposition that corporations possess such a freedom are
plainly distinguishable. Moreover, the plurality's presupposition
cannot be squared with the many precedents that implicitly reject the
presupposition."
Parts III(C) and Ill(D) argue that the plurality failed to
explain how certain findings crucial to its reasoning and to its appli-
cation of the first amendment could be derived from the facts of rec-
ord. Specifically, the plurality failed to justify its finding that state
compulsion of the utility would reduce the flow of information from
order. See infra note 18. The Chief Justice, thus, cast a fourth vote for the plurality's first
rationale; he neither addressed nor endorsed the plurality's second rationale. Justice Marshall
concurred in the judgment, but filed an opinion expressing a rationale different from that
relied on by the plurality. See infra note 18. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justices White and Stevens joined in part. See infra note 18. Justice Stevens also filed a
dissenting opinion. See infra note 18. Justice Blackmun did not participate, but there is reason
to believe that he would have dissented from the plurality's reasoning and result. See infra
note 11.
5. See infra notes 46-83 and accompanying text.
6. This article is concerned only with business corporations operated for profit. Govern-
ment compelled disclosure or dissemination of information by nonprofit corporations or
associations organized for the specific purpose of achieving the political or religious goals of
their members may raise distinct issues under the first amendment's freedom of speech and
religion clauses or under the implied first amendment right of association. See, e.g., NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
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the utility. Furthermore, the plurality inexplicably disregarded the
significance of the mandatory disclaimer that was to appear on all
third-party inserts distributed by the utility.
Finally, Part III(E) argues that since corporations do not pos-
sess freedom of mind, corporate agreement or disagreement with the
speech that the corporation is compelled to disseminate is of no sig-
nificance under the first amendment. As applied to corporate speech
(whether that speech be classified political, commercial, or other-
wise), the purpose of the first amendment is to ensure the free flow
of information to the public.7 Accordingly, the first amendment does
not prohibit compulsion of corporate speech per se. First amendment
protection should be triggered only in circumstances where the
compulsion has a collateral effect of suppressing or penalizing the
corporation's publication of its own views. Absent such a collateral
effect, government compulsion of corporate speech' should be upheld
if it rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. Since the PG&E
plurality failed to explain how the regulation at issue would have
had such a collateral effect, the regulation should have been analyzed
under the "rational basis" test. Had it been so analyzed, the regula-
tion may have been upheld.
II. SUMMARY OF THE PG&E CASE
A. The Facts
Appellant Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E or Utility), a
privately owned, state regulated utility company, had long included
in its monthly billing envelopes a newsletter addressed to its custom-
ers, or ratepayers. The newsletter, called Progress, discussed issues
of general public interest, including political issues and matters per-
taining to utility services and bills.' In 1980, appellee California
Public Utilities Commission (Commission), a state regulatory
agency, decided that the "extra space" in the billing envelopes,
which PG&E had been using to disseminate Progress, belonged to
PG&E's ratepayers.' 0 The Commission then apportioned the use of
7. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
8. This article uses the phrase "government compulsion of corporate speech" and like
phrases to refer to a government requirement that a corporation disclose or disseminate to the
public or to the government information generated either by the corporation itself or, as in
PG&E, by a source outside the corporation.
9. 106 S. Ct. at 905 n.l.
10. The Commission defined "extra space" to mean "'the space remaining in the billing
envelope, after inclusion of the monthly bill and any required legal notices, for inclusion of '
other materials up to such total envelope weight as would not result in any additional postage
19871
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this "extra space" between PG&E and a ratepayer-advocacy organi-
zation called Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN).1" Under
the apportionment, PG&E would be required to grant TURN access
to the "extra space" four times each year for the succeeding two
years. 2 On those occasions, PG&E would be permitted to use any of
the "extra space" not used by TURN, and would be permitted to
include additional materials if it paid any resulting increase in
postage.13
The Commission offered the following explanation for its ap-
portionment of the use of the "extra space": "Our goal . . . is to
change the present system to one which uses the extra space more
efficiently for the ratepayers' benefit. It is reasonable to assume that
the ratepayers will benefit more from exposure to a variety of views
than they will from only that of PG&E." '14 The plurality interpreted
the Commission's order to place no restrictions on the content of the
messages TURN could disseminate in the envelope space, 6 so long
cost.'" Id. at 906 (quoting Appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant at A-2 to A-
3, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986) [herein-
after Appendix]).
11. Justice Blackmun, who did not participate in the PG&E case, had earlier antici-
pated the sort of regulation-by-definition-of-property employed by the Commission in PG&E:
lI]t appears that New York and other States might use their power to define
property rights so that the billing envelope is the property of the ratepayers and
not of the utility's shareholders. If, under state law, the envelope belongs to the
customers, I do not see how restricting the utility from using it could possibly be
held to deprive the utility of its rights.
See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In PG&E, the Commis-
sion ruled that the "extra space" inside the billing envelope, not the envelope itself, belonged to
the ratepayers. This distinction appeared to be important to the plurality. See infra notes 34-
35 and accompanying text.
12. Access was granted to TURN in particular because the Commission found that
TURN represented a significant group of PG&E's residential customers and because TURN,
through its participation in utility rate-making proceedings, had "aided the Commission in
performing its regulatory function." PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 906. The record revealed that an-
other organization had also sought access to the "extra space" in PG&E's billing envelopes,
but that the Commission had denied the request on the ground that "that group neither wished
to participate in Commission proceedings nor alleged that its use of the billing envelope space
would improve consumer participation in those proceedings." Id. at 907 n.5. The Commission
reserved the right to grant access to groups in addition to TURN. Id. at 907.
13. Id. at 906.
14. Id. (quoting Appendix, supra note 10, at A-17).
15. Id. at 906-07. Cf id. at 923 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Steven's
reading of the record, the Commission's order limited the content of TURN's inserts to three
specified topics. TURN would be permitted: (1) to explain its program of ratepayer represen-
tation; (2) to identify "pending and anticipated PG&E applications and other cases likely to
have a significant effect on customers' rates and services," and (3) to solicit contributions to
support TURN's advocacy of ratepayers' interests before the Commission. Id. Justice Stevens
found the order constitutional as so limited. It bears mentioning that the Commission's order
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as TURN stated its messages were not those of PG&E. 6
B. The Plurality Opinion
Justice Powell, writing for the three-member plurality,17
framed the issue as follows: "[W]hether the California Public Utili-
ties Commission may require a privately owned utility company to
include in its billing envelopes speech of a third party with which
the utility disagrees." 8 The plurality began its analysis by noting
that PG&E's newsletter was entitled to "the full protection of the
First Amendment," since it was essentially a "small newspaper," not
described the purpose of TURN's proposal to be "soliciting funds to be used for residential
ratepayer representation in proceedings of this Commission involving PG&E." In adopting
TURN's proposal, the Commission established elaborate procedures to govern TURN's collec-
tion, use, and accounting of funds contributed by the recipients of its inserts. See Appendix,
supra note 10. These facts, which were not mentioned by the plurality, tend to corroborate
Justice Stevens' reading of the order.
16. See infra note 100.
17. See supra note 4.
18. 106 S. Ct. at 905. Chief Justice Burger, in his brief concurring opinion, seemed to
accept the plurality's statement of the issue. See id. at 914 (Burger, J., concurring) ("I would
not go beyond the central question presented by this case, which is the infringement of
[PG&E's] right to be free from forced association with views with which it disagrees."). The
Chief Justice found the cases of Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) and Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), to be dispositive of the issue. See PG&E, 106
S. Ct. at 914. (Tornillo and Wooley are discussed below. See infra notes 59-61 & 66-68 and
accompanying text). Justice Marshall, in an opinion concurring in the judgment, focused not
on the content of TURN's message or PG&E's possible disagreement therewith, but rather on
the nature of the property to which TURN would have access, and the impact of that access
on PG&E's first amendment rights. 106 S. Ct. at 914-17 (Marshall, J., concurring). Thus,
Justice Marshall viewed the issue as whether a state may redefine its common law property
rights so as to grant a third party access to a forum formerly used exclusively by its owner,
when such access impairs the owner's ability to exercise his own first amendment rights in the
forum. Id.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, did not question the plurality's statement of
the issue. However, he disagreed with the plurality's prediction of the impact of the Commis-
sion's order on PG&E's speech. Id. at 917-20 (Rehnquist, J., joined in part by White &
Stevens, JJ., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also disputed the plurality's assumption that cor-
porations enjoy a "negative" right of free speech, i.e., a right not to be compelled to speak. On
this argument, he stood alone. See id. at 920-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This article argues
that his position was correct. See infra Part Ill(B).
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, expressly questioned the plurality's statement of the
issue and criticized the plurality opinion for concerning itself largely with "questions that need
not be answered in order to decide this case." Id. at 922 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since
Justice Stevens did not interpret the Commission's order to permit TURN to disseminate po-
litical messages, or any messages not related to fund-raising or the ratepayers' interests before
the Commission, he viewed the issue more narrowly than did the plurality: "The narrow
question we must address is whether a state public utility commission may require the find-
raising solicitation of a consumer advocacy group to be carried in a utility billing envelope."
Id. at 922 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see supra note 15.
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a commercial solicitation.19 Having thus characterized the newslet-
ter, the plurality turned to Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,20 which it viewed as the most closely analogous precedent.
Tornillo involved a Florida right-of-reply statute, which
provided that if a newspaper published a criticism of a candidate's
character or record, the candidate could compel the paper to publish
his or her reply, in a space equal in prominence and size to the space
in which the criticism had appeared. 2 According to the PG&E plu-
rality, the statute at issue in Tornillo "directly interfered with the
newspaper's right to speak in two ways."22 First, the statute, in
effect, penalized the newspaper for expressing certain views critical
of candidates. Since the newspaper would likely refrain from pub-
lishing views that might obligate it to open its pages to outsiders, the
"inescapable" effect of the statute was to dampen the vigor of public
debate.2" Second, explained the PG&E plurality, the statute at issue
in Tornillo impermissibly interfered with the newspaper's editorial
judgment "by forcing the newspaper to tailor its speech to an oppo-
nent's agenda, and to respond to candidates' arguments where the
newspaper might prefer to be silent .... Since all speech inherently
involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid, this effect
was impermissible."2 '
The plurality then explained that for first amendment purposes,
a public utility is entitled to the same protections from compelled
access as the institutional press:
The concerns that caused us to invalidate the compelled access
rule in Tornillo apply to [PG&E] as well as to the institutional
press. . . . Just as the state is not free to 'tell a newspaper in
advance what it can print and what it cannot,' . . . the State is
not free either to restrict [PG&E's] speech to certain topics or to
force [PG&E] to respond to views that others may hold ...
Under Tornillo a forced access rule that would accomplish these
purposes indirectly is similarly forbidden."'
19. 106 S. Ct. at 907-08. (distinguishing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626 (1985) and Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980)).
20. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
21. Id. at 244-45 n.2.
22. PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 908.
23. See id. (discussing Tornillo).
24. 106 S. Ct. at 909 (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) and Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943)).
25. 106 S. Ct. at 909 (footnote and citations omitted). The plurality found insignificant
the fact that the Florida statute at issue in Tornillo compelled the newspaper to carry the
reply on its own paper, while the order sub judice required PG&E to disseminate a message
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The plurality particularly objected to the fact that the Commis-
sion granted access to PG&E's billing envelopes on the basis of the
content of the proposed speech. The Commission's order "discrimi-
nates on the basis of the viewpoints of the selected speakers ...
Access is limited to persons or groups - such as TURN - who
disagree with [PG&E's] views as expressed in Progress and who op-
pose [PG&E] in Commission proceedings."" In the plurality's view,
this content-based grant of access burdened PG&E's own expression
in the same impermissible manner that the state mandated right-of-
reply burdened the newspaper's expression in Tornillo - by impos-
ing a penalty on expression:
[B]ecause access is awarded only to those who disagree with
[PG&E's] views and who are hostile to [PG&E's] interests,
[PG&E] must contend with the fact that whenever it speaks out
on a given issue, it may be forced - at TURN's discretion -
to help disseminate hostile views. [PG&E] 'might well conclude'
that, under these circumstances, 'the safe course is to avoid con-
troversy,' thereby reducing the free flow of information and
ideas that the First Amendment seeks to promote. 27
In addition to reducing the flow of information, explained the
plurality, the Commission's order required PG&E to associate with
speech with which it disagreed. This was impermissible because it
forced PG&E "either to appear to agree with TURN's views or to
respond." Given TURN's general opposition to the utility's views,
"there can be little doubt that [PG&E] will feel compelled to
respond to arguments and allegations made by TURN in its
messages to [PG&E's] customers."2 In an important passage, the
plurality endeavored to explain and support its objection to this
"forced response" by a corporation:
That kind of forced response is antithetical to the free discussion
that the First Amendment seeks to foster. . . .For corporations
as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the
choice of what not to say. And we have held that speech does
not lose its protection because of the corporate identity of the
speaker. . . . Were the government freely able to compel
printed on paper supplied by others: "Like the Miami Herald, . . [PG&E] is still required
to carry speech with which it disagreed, and might well feel compelled to reply or limit its own
speech in response to TURN's." Id. at 909 n.7.
26. 106 S. Ct. at 910 (footnote omitted).
27. Id. (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257). This passage is further discussed in the text
accompanying notes 87-94 infra.
28. 106 S. Ct. at 911-12.
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corporate speakers to propound political messages with which
they disagree, this protection would be empty, for the govern-
ment could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which
they deny in the next. It is therefore incorrect to say, as do ap-
pellees, that our decisions do not limit the government's author-
ity to compel speech by corporations. The danger that [PG&E]
will be required to alter its own message as a consequence of
the government's coercive action is a proper object of First
Amendment solicitude, because the message itself is protected
under our decisions in Bellotti and Consolidated Edison.2 9
The plurality acknowledged that government compulsion of cor-
porate speech is a commonplace of commercial regulation, but it
distinguished the Commission's order from those "requiring appel-
lant to carry various legal notices." While the state "has substantial
leeway in determining appropriate information disclosure require-
ments for business corporations," it exceeds that leeway when it "re-
quire[s] corporations to carry the messages of third parties, where
the messages themselves are biased against or are expressly contrary
to the corporation's views.""0
The plurality also distinguished the case at hand from
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins. 1 There, the owner of a
shopping center asserted that his first amendment rights were in-
fringed by a state constitutional provision that had been construed to
require him to grant access to a group of students who sought to
distribute pamphlets and to circulate a petition in his shopping
center. The PruneYard Court rejected the owner's first amendment
claim and upheld the state constitutional provision. The PG&E plu-
rality distinguished PruneYard on the following grounds:
Notably absent from PruneYard was any concern that access to
this area might affect the shopping center owner's exercise of
his own right to speak: the owner did not even allege that he
objected to the content of the pamphlets; nor was the access
right content-based. PruneYard thus does not undercut the pro-
position that forced associations that burden protected speech
are impermissible."
29. Id. at 912 (footnote and citations omitted). See also Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
30. 106 S. Ct. at 911 n.12. The Justices offered no clear explanation for why, notwith-
standing the first amendment, the states enjoy "substantial leeway in determining appropriate
information disclosure requirements for business corporations." See infra note 112.
31. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
32. PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 910 (footnote omitted). The shopping center owner's failure to
object to the content of the pamphlets had been noted by Justice Powell, the author of the
PG&E plurality opinion, in his concurring opinion in PruneYard. See PruneYard, 447 U.S.
[Vol. 27
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The PG&E plurality also noted that PruneYard, unlike the present
case, involved privately owned property that was "peculiarly public
in nature." as
The plurality quickly dispensed with the Commission's conten-
tion that because the "extra space" in the billing envelopes belonged
to the ratepayers, PG&E had no constitutionally protected interest in
excluding other speakers from the space. The plurality relied on
Wooley v. Maynard,4 in which the Court rebuffed a state's effort to
compel two of its citizens to display, on their automobile, a state-
issued license plate bearing the state motto "Live Free or Die."
While the citizens had no property interest in the license plate itself,
they did own the automobile on which the plate was to be affixed.
Likewise, explained the plurality, "the Commission's order requires
[PG&E] to use its property - the billing envelopes - to distribute
the message of another. This is so whoever is deemed to own the
'extra space.' "5
Nor, in the plurality's view, did the result in Tornillo depend
on the newspaper's property interest in the paper on which the com-
pelled reply would be printed. "The constitutional difficulty with the
right-of-reply statute was that it required the newspaper to dissemi-
nate a message with which the newspaper disagreed. This difficulty
did not depend on whether the particular paper on which the replies
were printed belonged to the newspaper or to the candidate." 6 In
the view of the PG&E plurality the constitutionally significant fact
in both Wooley and Tornillo was the "forced association with poten-
tially hostile views," ' which, the plurality insisted, would either
dampen public debate or compel a response from one who would
prefer to remain silent.
Having satisfied itself that the Commission's order burdened
PG&E's constitutionally protected speech, the plurality proceeded to
test the order under traditional first amendment standards. The
plurality sought to determine whether the order was "a narrowly
tailored means of serving a compelling state interest."3 Two state
interests were identified: (1) the interest in effective rate making pro-
ceedings; and (2) the interest in providing PG&E customers with a
at 98-99 n.2, 101 (Powell, J., joined by White, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
33. 106 S. Ct. at 910 n,.8.
34. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
35. 106 S. Ct. at 912.
36. Id. at 913.
37. Id.
38. Id.
1987]
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variety of views. As to the former, the plurality reasoned that even if
the state's interest in effective rate making proceedings was compel-
ling, the interest could be served equally well through means that did
not intrude on PG&E's first amendment rights. The state could, for
example, impose on PG&E "the reasonable expenses of responsible
groups that represent the public interest at rate making
proceedings.""
Nor was the Commission's order narrowly tailored to serve the
second asserted state interest of ensuring the dissemination of a vari-
ety of views. The plurality explained that the criteria employed by
the Commission, in selecting views for dissemination, were not con-
tent-neutral.'0 Moreover, dissemination of TURN's speech was
achieved at the cost of inhibiting that of PG&E, a constitutionally
impermissible trade-off. "[T]he state cannot advance some points of
view by burdening the expression of others."' 1
The final step in the plurality's analysis was to determine
whether the Commission's order was a valid time, place, or manner
regulation. The plurality curtly rejected this contention, noting that
the order failed to satisfy one of the basic requirements of such a
regulation - that it be neutral as to the content of the speech to be
regulated.' 2
III. CRITIQUE OF THE PLURALITY OPINION
A. Summary Of The Critique
The principal flaw in the plurality's analysis, and the most
troubling one because it was conceptual rather than empirical, was
the plurality's presupposition that artificial legal entities, such as
corporations, enjoy "freedom of mind" under the first amendment.
Such freedom would protect corporations from government com-
pelled disclosure or dissemination of speech with which they disa-
gree. This presupposition, which formed the basis for the plurality's
finding of a first amendment violation,'" finds little support either in
law or in reason; indeed, it is inconsistent with the rationale for pro-
tecting corporate speech at all. Moreover, government compulsion of
corporate speech is a well established means of corporate regulation.
The plurality neither repudiated this practice nor reconciled it with
39. Id.
40. But see infra note 45.
41. 106 S. Ct. at 914.
42. Id.
43. See supra note 4.
[Vol. 27
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the plurality's fundamental presupposition - that the first amend-
ment protects corporate "freedom of mind."
Granting that there is no first amendment protection for
corporate "freedom of mind," the question becomes whether state
compulsion of corporate speech nevertheless infringes those corporate
speech rights that are recognized in the law. Case law establishes
that the first amendment shields both individuals and corporations
from government efforts to suppress or penalize protected speech.""
Accordingly, if a regulation compelling a corporation to speak has a
collateral effect of suppressing or penalizing the corporation's own
speech, then the regulation should be analyzed under the first
amendment.
Would the Commission's order in PG&E have had such an ef-
fect? The impact that the Commission's order would have had on
PG&E's speech could not be known in advance. Part of the explana-
tion for the fragmentation of the Court in PG&E lies in the Justices'
differing interpretations of the Commission's order, and the resulting
differences in their estimations of the impact of that order on
PG&E."5 While the plurality cannot be faulted simply for settling
on one interpretation rather than another (assuming its preferred in-
terpretation was fairly grounded in the language of the order), the
44. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam);
Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. 530; First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
45. Compare PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 910 n.9 (plurality opinion) (Commission's order
leaves TURN free to advocate its position as best it can and "does not restrict the scope or
content of TURN's message.") and id. at 911 (plurality opinion) ("The order on its face
leaves TURN free to use the billing envelopes to discuss any issues it chooses.") (footnote
omitted) with id. at 923 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Commission's order limits TURN's insert to
three specific matters; it does not sanction the "free-wheeling political debate the plurality
opinion presupposes."). See also supra note 15.
The plurality's construction of the order as granting TURN "open-ended" access to the
billing envelopes, with no restriction on the scope or content of TURN's message, seems incon-
sistent with its simultaneous finding that the Commission's order was impermissibly content-
based. Compare PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 910 with id. at 910 n.9. State action is "content-based"
when it treats speech favorably or unfavorably according to the subject matter of the speech.
See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). When the government provides access
to a forum solely on the basis of the speaker's identity or status, without regard to, or restric-
tion on, the content or subject matter of the speech, is the government's action "content based"?
Compare Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 & n.9 (1983)
(majority opinion) (access policy based on status of speaker rather than on its views is not
viewpoint discrimination) with id. at 65 (Brennan, Marshall, Powell & Stevens, JJ., dissent-
ing) (speaker's status "has nothing to do with whether viewpoint discrimination in fact has
occurred"). The PG&E plurality assumed so, without explanation. The question clearly mer-
its a more considered treatment than it received in PG&E.
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opinion failed to explain how the order, as interpreted, could have
had the proscribed impact on speech.
The plurality opinion is flawed by its failure to satisfactorily
demonstrate a link between the order sub judice and the predicted
impact of that order on the Utility's speech. First, the plurality failed
to explain how the order could have resulted in a reduction in the
flow of information from PG&E to its ratepayers. In fact, the order,
as interpreted by the plurality, could only have increased the flow of
information. Second, while the plurality acknowledged that the
Commission's order required TURN to include a disclaimer disasso-
ciating PG&E from TURN's views, the plurality inexplicably
accorded this important fact almost no weight in its analysis of the
order's likely impact on PG&E's speech. The mandatory disclaimer
ensured that the Utility would not be required to espouse, endorse,
publish or even be associated with any views with which it dis-
agreed. Accordingly, PG&E's supposed need to respond would have
been no more compelling under the Commission's order than it
would have been had TURN distributed identical inserts to the same
customers via TURN's own envelopes.
In summary, because the first amendment is not triggered by
alleged infringements of so-called corporate freedom of mind and be-
cause the PG&E plurality failed to explain how the order at issue
would have had the collateral effect of suppressing or penalizing the
corporation's own speech, the order should not have been subjected
to first amendment analysis. The order, like other routine state regu-
lations of corporate behavior, should have been tested under the
"rational basis" standard.
B. The Plurality's Presupposition That Corporations Possess
"Freedom Of Mind" Under The First Amendment Is Legally
Untenable
The fundamental flaw in the plurality's analysis was its pre-
supposition that PG&E, as a corporation, possesses a "freedom of
mind" and that the first amendment protects that freedom from in-
fringement by the state. That presupposition is both unprecedented
and legally untenable.
While the plurality never expressly acknowledged that it was
presupposing the existence of corporate "freedom of mind," this
must be inferred from its opinion for several reasons. First, the plu-
rality asserted that "[f]or corporations as for individuals, the choice
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to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say.""' By thus
refusing to distinguish corporate from individual "negative" speech
rights, the plurality implicitly assumed that corporations as well as
individuals enjoy the "freedom of mind" that forms the basis for
such rights. Second, and more importantly, the plurality viewed the
"freedom of mind" cases as controlling precedents, 47 which strongly
suggests that the plurality also understood PG&E to be a "freedom
of mind" case. This interpretation is further supported by the plu-
rality's repeated emphasis on the utility's disagreement with the
compelled speech." Indeed, the plurality distinguished PruneYard
on the ground that the property owner in that case, who was
required to grant access to speakers, failed to object to the views of
those speakers. 9
The notion that the first amendment forbids the state from com-
pelling expression of objectionable ideas or opinions originated with
the Court's decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.8 In that case, the state board of education had promul-
gated a resolution requiring all public school students to salute the
nation's flag and to recite a prescribed pledge of allegiance, as a reg-
ular part of the school program. Plaintiffs, members of the Jehovah's
Witnesses faith, sought an injunction to restrain application of the
salute and pledge requirement to them. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,
that in requiring them to affirm beliefs they did not hold, the state
abridged their first and fourteenth amendment freedoms of speech.
The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the injunction."1
The PG&E plurality understood Barnette and its progeny52 to
46. 106 S. Ct. at 912.
47. See infra notes 52-68 and accompanying text. The Chief Justice relied solely on the
"freedom of mind" cases. See supra note 18.
48. See, e.g., PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 909 n.7 ("Like the Miami Herald [newspaper in
Tornillo], . . . [PG&E] is . . . required to carry speech with which it disagreed."); id. at 911
n.1l (discussing the possibility of PG&E's "strong disagreement" with the substance of
TURN's message); id. at 911 n.12 (messages "expressly contrary to the corporation's views").
See also id. at 913 n.15; id. at 914 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (stating that the "central ques-
tion" in the case was whether PG&E possessed a "right to be free from forced association with
views with which it disagrees" and that the plurality "need not go beyond the authority of
Wooley v. Maynard" to answer the question). In its argument, PG&E had stressed its disa-
greement with the compelled speech, and the plurality even incorporated the fact of disagree-
ment into its statement of the issue. See id. at 907; see also supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
49. See PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 909-10; supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
50. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
51. Id. at 642.
52. See Wooley, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977).
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stand for the sweeping proposition that no speaker may be compelled
by government to say what he prefers not to say.53 The plurality
read Barnette too broadly. The particular interest or the specific
freedom cited by the Barnette Court as having been unconstitution-
ally abridged by the compulsory flag salute, was "individual freedom
of mind,"8 a freedom that inanimate entities, such as corporations,
cannot meaningfully be said to enjoy. Indeed, the issue identified
by the Barnette majority was "whether such a [flag salute] ceremony
so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed
upon the individual by official authority under powers committed to
any political organization under our Constitution." 6 The many ref-
erences to "individual opinion and personal attitude," "attitude of
mind, ''the individual's right to speak his own mind," and the like,
evidence the concern for the individual that suffuses both the major-
ity 7 and concurring opinions. 3
Each of the cases that later applied the principles of Barnette to
invalidate government action under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments also involved an individual. In Wooley," for example, the
Court, relying heavily on Barnette, decided that the first amend-
ment's free speech clause prohibited a state from requiring a fol-
lower of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith to display on his automobile a
state-issued license plate bearing the motto "Live Free or Die." The
Court reasoned that the state had no power to invade "the sphere of
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to
53. See PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 912 n.13 ("As we stated in Wooley, '[a] system which
secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.' ") Id.
54. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
55. See Harpaz, supra note 3, at 901-02 (The PG&E Court "failed to appreciate the
important distinctions between Barnette with its concern for intellectual individualism, and the
plight of a utility forced to share its billing envelope with its opposition.").
56. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 636 (emphasis added).
57. See id. at 631, 633, 634, 637. See also id. at 641 (referring to the "freedom to be
intellectually and spiritually diverse").
58. See id. at 643-44 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring); id. at 646 (Murphy, J., con-
curring) (noting that the state action at issue restrained "the freedom of the individual to be
vocal or silent according to his conscience or personal inclination"). See also T. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-5 (1963) (suggesting that the
first amendment must ultimately be justified by reference to the individual qua individual, that
is, to the individual's right to develop his personhood free from governmental interference); see
also Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REV. 1, 6
(1976) (free speech merits protection to the extent that it furthers the speaker's interest in self-
expression).
59. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). For a discussion of the background of Wooley and the lower
federal court opinion in the case, see Note, Compelled Expression: Maynard v. Wooley, 28
ME. L. REV. 531 (1976).
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our Constitution to reserve from all official control."" As in Bar-
nette, both the reasoning and the result in Wooley reflected the
Court's solicitude for the conscience and personal values of the
individual."
Barnette has also been invoked by many lower federal courts in
cases involving compulsory salutes or pledges to national symbols.
Not surprisingly, all such cases involved the compulsion of individu-
als who enjoy a "freedom of mind" under the first amendment.6"
Similarly, in other factual contexts, the decisions that have
invoked the notion of freedom of mind or belief as a basis for forbid-
ding government compelled speech have involved individuals, not
corporations.6" For example, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion,64 a state law authorized unions and local government employers
to agree to an arrangement under which every employee represented
60. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
61. See Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expres-
sion and Association, 23 B.C.L. REv. 995, 1005 n.72 (1982) ("Although the Court did not
speak specifically in terms of freedom of conscience, the injuries to individual interests in
Barnette and Wooley were to this interest."). Id. The Wooley Court also relied in part on
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, which involved the rights of a corporation, not an individual. (See
supra text accompanying note 21, for the facts of Tornillo.) According to the Wooley majority,
Tornillo "illustrated" the right to refrain from speaking recognized in Barnette. Wooley, 430
U.S. at 714. The suggestion that Tornillo illustrated Barnette is highly questionable, inas-
much as the Tornillo Court neither discussed nor cited Barnette. In any event, to view
Tornillo as support for the proposition that corporations, as well as individuals, enjoy a "free-
dom of mind" is to misread the case. -As discussed below, Tornillo should be understood as a
traditional, restraint of speech case, rather than as a recognition of corporate "freedom of
mind." See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1978) (statute requiring flag salute
held unconstitutional); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973) (student refusal to salute
flag); Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932
(1973) (invalidating dismissal of teacher for refusal to salute flag); Hanover v. Northrup, 325
F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1970) (teacher refusal to salute flag); Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruc-
tion, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated without op., 401 U.S. 988 (1971) (student
refusal to salute flag); Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (student refusal to
salute flag); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963) (student refusal to stand for
national anthem).
63. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discharge or
threat of discharge of public employees because of their refusal to affiliate with designated
political party violates first amendment); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (seeker of
public office cannot be compelled to declare a belief in God); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958) (statute requiring loyalty oath as a condition to receiving property tax exemption vio-
lates first amendment); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (state employees cannot be
required to take a loyalty oath denying affiliation with Communist Party). But see United
States v. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs, 555 F.2d 978, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd on other
grounds, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (stating, without citation or explanation, that "[tlo force an
association of individuals to express as its own opinion judicially dictated ideas is to encroach
on that sphere of free thought and expression protected by the First Amendment") Id.
64. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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by the union - even if not a union member - was required as a
condition of employment to pay the union a service fee equal to the
dues paid by union members. A group of nonmember public school
teachers instituted a class action challenging the compulsory
contribution law, claiming that they objected to the political and ide-
ological activities on which the union regularly spent a portion of
their fees. The Court held that the first amendment prohibited the
state from requiring any individual "to contribute to the support of
an ideological cause he may oppose as a condition of holding a job as
a public school teacher." 6 Abood provides no support for the pro-
position that artificial "persons" enjoy the same or a similar protec-
tion under the first amendment.
Until the PG&E case, the Court had never invoked Barnette on
behalf of a corporation. Even in Tornillo," in which the first
amendment was held to protect a newspaper corporation from being
compelled by government to print editorial replies of third parties,
the court did not rely on Barnette's "freedom of mind" rationale.
Indeed, the Tornillo Court did not even cite Barnette. The Court's
principal objection to the statute at issue in Tornillo was that it
operated to suppress speech:
Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper
that published news or commentary arguably within the reach
of the right-of-access statute, editors might well conclude that
the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under the op-
eration of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage
would be blunted or reduced. 7
Tornillo should be understood as a traditional, restraint of
speech case. To derive from Tornillo the principle that corporations
enjoy a constitutionally recognized "freedom of mind" comparable to
that enjoyed by individuals is to misapprehend the Court's
reasoning. 68
65. Id. at 235.
66. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
67. Id. at 257 (footnote omitted).
68. Buttressing the view that Tornillo was not a "freedom of mind" case is the fact that
the result in Tornillo did not turn on the newspaper's disagreement with the replies that it
was required to publish. While one may reasonably assume that the newspaper would have
disagreed with at least some of the replies, the Court did not base its ruling on such an
assumption. The "penalty" at issue was compulsory publication of opinions generally, not
compulsory publication of objectionable or disagreeable opinions.
Although the Court did add, almost as an afterthought in the final paragraph of the
opinion, that the statute unconstitutionally "intrulded] into the function of editors" by regulat-
ing the content of newspapers, this observation cannot reasonably be read as a recognition of
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The opinions in Barnette and its progeny focused on individual
freedoms, rather than on corporate freedoms, because they involved
individuals. In these cases the Court did not address the correspond-
ing freedoms of public utilities and other corporations. Surely, the
Barnette line of cases does not foreclose the possibility that corpora-
tions (which after all do enjoy a constitutionally recognized freedom
of speech) 9 might enjoy something akin to a "freedom of mind."
This "freedom of mind" would shield them, as much as an individ-
ual, from being compelled to speak against their "beliefs."
This argument must be rejected for several reasons. First and
foremost, the supposed corporate right to refrain from speaking is
wholly inconsistent with the rationale for affording first amendment
protection to corporations. While the Court has held that the first
amendment protects corporate speech under certain circumstances,
the Court has never grounded such protection on any supposed right
of corporate self-expression or self-development."0 Rather, the Court
has grounded protection of corporate speech on "the informational
any general corporate freedom of mind; and indeed, the PG&E plurality did not so read it. See
PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 909 n.7 ("In the last paragraph of the [Tornillo] opinion, the Court
concluded that an independent ground for invalidating the statute was its effect on editors'
allocation of scarce newspaper space." (emphasis omitted)). To support its finding of an un-
constitutional intrusion into the editorial function, the Tornillo Court relied only on the special
"First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time." 418 U.S. at
258 (emphasis added). See id. at 259 (White, J., concurring) ("A newspaper or magazine is
not a public utility subject to 'reasonable' governmental regulation in matters affecting the
exercise of journalistic judgment as to what shall be printed.") Id. But see First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,. concurring) (questioning a reading of
the Press Clause that would permit government to "impose on non-media corporations restric-
tions not permissible with respect to 'media' enterprises"). d. Thus, to rely on Tornillo, as the
PG&E plurality seemed to do, for the proposition that corporations generally cannot be com-
pelled to disseminate any speech with which they disagree, even when the speech carries a
disclaimer, is to give Tornillo an unjustifiably broad reading. The fundamental problem in
Tornillo was restraint, not compulsion, of a newspaper, not a utility. See Gaebler, supra note
61, at 996-97 n.4 (While Tornillo "superficially appear[s] to protect a [corporate] right to
refrain from speech," the decision "can be explained on traditional first amendment
grounds."). Id. But see Comment, Political Patronage in Public Contracting, 51 U. CH. L.
REV. 518, 521 n.14 (1984) (citing Tornillo, without discussion, for the proposition that "Itihe
Court has invalidated a number of laws on the basis of this premise [individual freedom of
mind]") Id.
69. See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. 530; Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1977).
70. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784 (speech pertaining to a state referendum is protected under
first amendment by virtue of its informational value to its intended audience, notwithstanding
its corporate source). The Bellotti Court expressly declined to consider "whether corporations
have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment," or to
decide "whether, under different circumstances, a justification for a restriction on speech that
would be inadequate as applied to individuals might suffice to sustain the same restriction as
applied to corporations, unions, or like entities." Id. at 777 & n.13.
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purpose of the First Amendment,"71 i.e. on the right of the public to
receive information.7 The rationale for first amendment protection
lies not in any consideration of the needs or interests of the corporate
speaker but rather in the right of the public to hear and consider
various points of view. Therefore, the corporation has no first
amendment interest in withholding information from the public,
71
absent a showing that its right to affirmatively present its own views
is somehow impaired when it is compelled to disseminate the views
of others. 4
Moreover, the suggestion that a corporation enjoys a kind of
freedom of mind that protects it against being compelled to disclose
or disseminate speech with which the corporation disagrees is irrec-
oncilable with the statutes and regulations that compel corporations
to do precisely that. Cigarette manufacturers, for example, are
required by federal law to disseminate with their products the views
of a third party - the United States Surgeon General - notwith-
standing that those views are controversial and objectionable to the
manufacturers.7 5 Similarly, Congress has empowered cable franchise
authorities to require cable television operators to allocate channel
71. Id. at 782 n.18.
72. See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 533-34 (first amendment protection of corpo-
rate political speech derives from hearer's right to receive rather than from the corporation's
supposed independent right to speak); Baldwin & Karpay, Corporate Political Free Speech: 2
U.S.C. § 441b and the Superior Rights of Natural Persons, 14 PAc. L.J. 209, 223-24 (1983);
Patton & Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech: The Political Impact of Le-
gal Mythology, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 494, 497-501; Prentice, Consolidated Edison and Bellotti:
First Amendment Protection of Corporate Political Speech, 16 TULSA L.J. 599, 610-12
(1981). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 764 (1976) (commercial advertisement enjoys first amendment protection by virtue of
its informational value, without regard to its source).
73. See PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 921 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Because the Constitution
protects corporate speech for its informational value to society, "the constitutional interest of a
corporation in not permitting the presentation of other distinct views clearly identified as those
of the speaker is de minimis."). Id. Cf Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985) ("Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech
is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides, ...
[a commercial advertiser's] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular
factual information in his advertising is minimal." (emphasis in original)); id. Virginia Phar-
macy Board, 425 U.S. at 781 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe elimination of false and decep-
tive claims [by commercial advertisers] serves to promote the one facet of commercial price and
product advertising that warrants First Amendment protection - its contribution to the flow
of accurate and reliable information relevant to public and private decision making."); id.
Gaebler, supra note 61, at 1009 ("[Wlhile compelled expression may infringe upon individual
interests it should not be condemned as an interference with the 'free marketplace of ideas.' ").
Id.
74. See, e.g., Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. H 1984).
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capacity for public, educational or governmental use, and the opera-
tors are forbidden from exercising editorial control over channel
capacity so allocated.7 In other words, the cable operators may be
compelled to disseminate the views of third parties. In addition, a
vast array of statutes and regulations compel corporations to disclose
opinions or information generated by the corporations themselves."
The PG&E plurality failed to reconcile any of the foregoing statutes
and regulations with the supposed corporate right not to speak and
not to be associated with disagreeable views."
The absence of precedent for the PG&E plurality's extension of
Barnette is not surprising. The corporation owes both its existence
and its powers to the state. 79 The corporation possesses no character-
istics that even remotely resemble the mind and conscience that guide
human behavior and that justify recognition and protection of indi-
vidual freedom of mind under the first amendment. A corporation
can think and act only through its human agents. Accordingly, the
corporation cannot independently experience coercion, intimidation,
infringement of personal belief, or any mental state akin to those
that prompted the Court to accord first amendment protection to the
'individual litigants in Barnette, Wooley and Abood. To extend cases
premised on an individual's freedom of conscience to nonhuman bus-
iness entities is to strain the rationale of those cases "beyond the
breaking point. To ascribe to such artificial entities an 'intellect' or
'mind' for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor
76. See 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. III 1985). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1986) (re-
quiring incumbent board of directors to transmit to shareholders proposals of dissident
shareholders).
77. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78111 (1982) (disclosure requirements in securities regis-
trations); Id. at § 1637 (requiring creditor to disclose to consumer specified information
germane to open end consumer credit plan); id. at § 1663 (requiring advertisements for con-
sumer credit under an open end credit plan to disclose specified information); id. at § 1667a
(required disclosures in consumer leases); 39 U.S.C. § 3685 (1982) (requiring disclosure of
ownership, circulation, distribution, and other information by publications having periodical
publication mail privileges); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6-.9 (1986) (implementing federal credit disclo-
sure requirements); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.22-.27 (1986) (compelling disclosure by financial insti-
tutions of certain currency and foreign transactions). See also infra note 112 (legal notices);
PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 923 & nn.3, 4 & 5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Comment, Disclosure as a
Legislative Device, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1273 (1963).
78. See infra note 112.
79. "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con-
templation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the
charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence."
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 534 (1819) (opinion by Marshall,
C.J.).
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with reality."8
Indeed, when the first amendment. rights of corporations were
first recognized, the Court acknowledged the common sense distinc-
tion between the corporation and the individual, and the significance
of that distinction in identifying their respective constitutional rights:
Certain 'purely personal' guarantees, such as the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corpo-
rations and other organizations because the 'historic function' of
the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of
individuals. . . . Whether or not a particular guarantee is
'purely personal' or is unavailable to corporations for some
other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the
particular constitutional provision."'
The nature, history, and purpose of the freedom of mind
recognized in Barnette all suggest that like the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination, freedom of mind is a "purely personal"
guarantee, which cannot sensibly be invoked to protect a corporation.
As Justice White has explained:
[Aln examination of'the First Amendment values that corporate
expression furthers and the threat to the functioning of a free
society it is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible with
communications emanating from individuals and is subject to
restrictions which individual expression is not. Indeed, what
some have considered to be the principal function of the First
Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-
80. PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 921 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally O'Kelley, The
Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the
Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEo. L.J. 1347 (1979). To assume that
a corporation possesses a mind or conscience, the freedom of which merits protection, is to
commit what Professor O'Kelley calls the "category-mistake of treating corporations as either
natural persons or creatures capable of physical acts such as speech or expression." See id. at
1349-51, 1382. Accord Patton & Bartlett, supra note 72, at 498, 508-09.
81. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778-79 n.14. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-
700 (1944) ("The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal
one, applying only to natural individuals. . . . The framers of the constitutional guarantee
against compulsory self-disclosure . . . cannot be said to have intended the privilege to be
available to protect economic or other interests of [corporations] so as to nullify appropriate
governmental regulations.") Accord Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906). See also Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S.
243, 255 (1906) (Fourteenth amendment's protection of "liberty" applies to "natural persons
not artificial persons."); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65 (1974) (quoting
with approval United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1949)) ("[C]orporations
can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy."). Id. See gener-
ally O'Kelley, supra note 80. "Constitutional rights that by their very nature can only apply
to a natural person have not been extended to corporations." Id. at 1382.
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expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all fur-
thered by corporate speech. It is clear that the communications
of profit making corporations are not 'an. integral part of the
development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the
affirmation of self.' They do not represent a manifestation of
individual freedom or choice."2
In short, not only is there no legal support for the proposition
that artificial entities such as corporations enjoy "freedom of mind"
under the first amendment, but the proposition is flatly inconsistent
with both the Court's rationale for protecting corporate speech and
the established and accepted regulatory practice of compelling such
speech. The PG&E plurality's presupposition that corporations do
enjoy "freedom of mind" is untenable.
Unless, as in Tornillo,83 the corporation can demonstrate that a
collateral effect of compulsion is to suppress or penalize the corpora-
tion's own speech, cases involving government compulsion of
corporate speech should not be analyzed under the first amendment.
The following two sections of this article demonstrate that the
PG&E plurality failed to show that the order at issue would have
had the prohibited collateral effect of suppressing or penalizing the
utility's speech.
C. The Plurality Failed To Justify Its Finding That The Commis-
sion's Order Would Reduce The Flow Of Information From The
Utility
The plurality objected to the Commission's order on the ground
that it imposed a penalty on PG&E's expression and would there-
fore cause a "reduc[tion] in the free flow of information and ideas
that the First Amendment seeks to promote."8 ' The plurality sought
to analogize the Commission's order to the right-of-reply statute at
issue in Tornillo,8" but correctly recognized that the analogy was
imperfect since TURN's access was automatic and did not depend
on the utility's expression of any particular views: "The Commis-
sion's order is not, in Tornillo's words, a 'content-based penalty' in
the first sense, because TURN's access to [PG&E's] envelopes is not
conditioned on any particular expression by [PG&E]."86
82. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804-05 (White, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
83. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
84. PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 910.
85. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
86. PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 910. [citations omitted].
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The following excerpt constitutes the sole explanation offered
by the plurality for its finding that the Commission's order would
reduce the flow of information from the utility to its customers:
[Blecause access is awarded only to those who disagree with
[PG&E's] views and who are hostile to [PG&E's] interests,
[PG&E] must contend with the fact that whenever it speaks out
on a given issue, it may be forced - at TURN's discretion -
to help disseminate hostile views. [PG&E] 'might well conclude'
that, under these circumstances, 'the safe course is to avoid con-
troversy,' thereby reducing the free flow of information and
ideas that the First Amendment seeks to promote.1
7
Yet, according to the plurality's own interpretation of the order,
TURN was to be guaranteed access to the billing envelopes "four
times a year for the next two years." '88 Moreover, the parties were
ordered by the PUC to designate, in advance of the first month of
access, the specific eight months in which TURN's inserts would be
distributed by the utility.89 The plurality never explained how such
automatic and guaranteed access (which the plurality inexplicably
characterized as access "at TURN's discretion") 90 was at all related
to whether "[PG&E] speaks out on a given issue." ' "
One possible explanation for the plurality's conclusion was sug-
gested in Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion. Justice Rehnquist
understood the plurality to be concerned that "the possibility of min-
imizing the undesirable content of TURN's speech may induce
PG&E to adopt a strategy of avoiding certain topics in hopes that
TURN will not think to address them on its own. '"" However, the
dissenting opinion also noted, "such a strategy [by the utility] would
depend on any group given access being little more than a reactive
organization," i.e., an organization that would address issues only
after they had been raised initially by PG&E." The record clearly
revealed that in granting access to the billing envelopes, the Commis-
sion's purpose was not to provide a voice to react to the utility's
pronouncements on diverse political and social issues, but to enhance
ratepayer participation in rate making proceedings and to improve
87. Id. (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257).
88. 106 S. Ct. at 906.
89. Appendix, supra note 10.
90. PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 910.
91. Id. at 905.
92. Id. at 920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The fact that the Commission reserved the
right to grant access to groups in addition to TURN lends some support to this reading of the
plurality opinion. See id. at 907.
93. Id. at 920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the Commission's performance of its regulatory function.94 The
Commission clearly expected that the groups gaining access to the
billing envelopes would affirmatively pursue these laudable ends,
independent of the utility's expression of views on these or other
matters.
In any event, even without access to PG&E's billing envelopes,
the ratepayer-advocacy groups were free to pursue their ends and to
respond to PG&E's publications. The groups could simply have
published their views and solicited contributions through other
media. The plurality never explained why the Commission's order,
which merely opened a new avenue of communication between an
existing ratepayer-advocacy group and its constituency, created any
disincentive for PG&E to speak that did not already exist. In other
words, the plurality failed to justify, and the facts did not support,
the finding that the Commission's order would proximately cause
any reduction in the flow of information from the utility.95 The best
that can be said for the plurality's prediction that the Commission's
order would reduce the flow of information is that it was, in Justice
Rehnquist's words, "extremely implausible."' 6
D. The Plurality Inexplicably Disregarded The Significance Of
The Mandatory Disclaimer, Which Effectively Disassociated PG&E
From TURN's Views
Before a claimed infringement of a first amendment right to be
free from government compelled expression can be demonstrated, the
plaintiff must show that he is being linked in some way to the
expression at issue. This nexus between speaker and message is clear
in cases where the government compels an individual to proclaim an
idea verbally, for absent unusual circumstances, a person will be
identified with the words that he utters.97 As the link between the
speaker and the compelled message grows more attenuated, however,
it becomes less likely that the message will be identified as that of the
speaker, and the constitutional claim grows correspondingly
weaker."8
94. See id. at 906; see also supra note 12.
95. This argument also undermines the plurality's prediction that the Commission's or-
der would have had the result of compelling the utility to respond to TURN's views. See infra
notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
96. PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97. See, e.g., Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); See also supra note 62 and cases cited
therein.
98. See, e.g., Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 859 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring)
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[Als the required participation becomes less direct and personal
the likelihood decreases that compliance will identify the indi-
vidual with the message expressed. Unless the government
requires an individual to do something which reasonably identi-
fies him with a message it is difficult to describe the govern-
ment's action as compelling expression.'9
The PG&E plurality conceded that the mandatory disclaimer
served to "avoid giving readers the mistaken impression that
TURN's words are really those of [PG&E]."'' The plurality, nev-
ertheless, concluded that by requiring PG&E merely to carry
TURN's inserts in the billing envelopes, the Commission forced the
utility to "associate" with TURN's hostile views. The impermissible
result of this "forced association," explained the plurality, was that
the utility would feel compelled to respond.101
The plurality failed to explain why the mandatory disclaimer,
which admittedly disassociated PG&E from TURN's views, would
not also have negated any inference of "association" that otherwise
might have been drawn from the inclusion of PG&E's and TURN's
respective inserts in a single envelope. This form of disclaimer
(which is commonplace in both the broadcast and print media and,
presumably, familiar to the public) would be ineffective in disassoci-
ating PG&E from TURN's views only if the recipients ignored
TURN's insert. In that case, of course, TURN's other messages
would also go unread, and PG&E would not be associated with
them. The plurality assumed that customers would read and com-
prehend the substance of TURN's insert but would not read and
comprehend the mandatory disclaimer appearing on the same insert.
The plurality's failure to credit the effect of the mandatory dis-
claimer also undermined its conclusion that PG&E "might. well feel
compelled to reply" to TURN's inserts.102 The legally significant
(first and fourteenth amendment challenge to state bar annual dues requirement) ("[Elveryone
understands or should understand that the views expressed are those of the State Bar as an
entity separate and distinct from each individual."). But see Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458
(D.N.M. 1982) (collection of mandatory bar dues for purpose of lobbying for and against
specific legislation infringed members' first amendment rights).
99. Gaebler, supra note 61, at 1010.
100. PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 911 n.l 1. The disclaimer requirement appeared in paragraph
5(e) of the Commission's order, which provided: "All of TURN's material shall clearly iden-
tify TURN as its source and state that its contents have been neither reviewed nor endorsed by
PG&E or this Commission." Appendix, supra note 10, at A-32.
101. See PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 911 & n.1l.
102. Id. at 909 n.7. Cf PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87-88 (The state, in granting access to
shopping center by persons wishing to speak and circulate petitions therein, did not thereby
compel center's owners to subscribe to any views; owners were "free to publicly disassociate
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question was whether, as a proximate result of the Commission's
order, PG&E would feel compelled to respond to the matters raised
by TURN. Any compulsion the utility might feel would stem solely
from the fact that views with which it disagreed were reaching the
ratepayers; not from the fact that those views happened to be trans-
mitted via the utility's billing envelopes. The Commission's order did
no more than open a single, narrow, perhaps more efficient avenue
of communication. Absent the Commission's order, TURN legally
could have spread identical messages by other media, and PG&E
presumably would have felt equally compelled to respond. 10 3
As a practical matter, TURN's ability to compel a response
themselves from the views of the speakers or handbillers."). Id. In his separate concurring
opinion in PruneYard, Justice Powell, joined by Justice White, noted that simply preserving a
property owner's ability to disavow or disclaim the messages of others who use his property
might not solve the constitutional difficulty, because the first amendment protects an individ-
ual's "right to refrain from speaking at all." Id. at 99 (Powell, J., joined by White, J., concur-
ring in part and in the judgment) (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)). The
Commission's order in PG&E avoided this difficulty by placing the burden of issuing a dis-
claimer on the party granted access.
In PruneYard, Justice Powell further argued, however, that "the right to control one's
own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when listeners will not assume that the
messages expressed on private property are those of the owner." 477 U.S. at 100 (footnote
omitted). He cited several examples, including a minority-owned business confronted by speak-
ers from the Ku Klux Klan, and a church-operated enterprise compelled to grant access to
speakers advocating abortions. "The strong emotions evoked by speech in such situations may
virtually compel the proprietor to respond," even though listeners do not mistake the speech's
source. Id. at 99-100. Justice Powell's point may have merit in cases involving individual
property owners. (The cases he cited to support the point, Wooley and Abood, both involved
compulsion of individuals.) However, the suggestion that an artificial legal entity such as a
corporation, as distinguished from its individual managers, directors and shareholders, will feel
compelled by "strong emotions" to respond to unpalatable views is implausible indeed. In any
event, as demonstrated in Part III(B) above, corporations, unlike individuals, do not enjoy a
first amendment right to be free from compelled responses.
103. In this respect, PG&E is the mirror image of Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (5-4 decision). In Perry, a local board of education
excluded plaintiff, a teachers' association, from a narrow, government-owned but non-public
avenue of communication - the school district's internal mail system. The board granted a
rival group access to the mail system, in recognition of the group's status as the teachers'
official bargaining representative.. In rejecting plaintiff's first amendment challenge to the
exclusion, the majority noted that plaintiff had made "no showing ... that [its] ability to
communicate with teachers is seriously impinged by the restricted access to the internal mail
system." Id. at 53. Given the "substantial alternative channels that remain[ed] open for union-
teacher communication," the effect of the exclusion on plaintiff's ability to communicate was
de minimis. Id. If exclusion from a single, narrow avenue of communication (an internal mail
system) does not seriously impinge the ability to communicate, then access to a comparably
narrow channel (PG&E's billing envelopes) should not be deemed to seriously enhance the
ability to communicate. TURN's views would have been equally coercive of a response from
PG&E, and PG&E's perceived need to counter TURN's views would have been equally com-
pelling, had TURN not gained access to the billing envelopes.
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from PG&E depended not on the Commission's solicitude but on
TURN's own financial resources. Of course, granting TURN access
to the billing envelopes gave TURN a "free ride," a means of mail-
ing its messages to the ratepayers without having to deplete its own
resources. However, this "free ride" resulted in no cost to PG&E
since the "extra space" allocated to TURN, which was a byproduct
of the billing process, was being funded by the ratepayers, not by
PG&E."0 4 Moreover, the Commission ordered TURN to pay for the
cost of insertion of its materials into the billing envelopes and for
"all reasonable costs [PG&E] incurs beyond its usual cost of billing
that result from the addition of TURN's materials."10 5 PG&E,
therefore, was not being required to subsidize TURN.
But even assuming that the Commission's order did, in effect,
require PG&E to subsidize its adversaries, PG&E apparently would
have no basis for objecting. The plurality, in dictum, expressly sanc-
tioned compulsory subsidization of TURN by PG&E. The plurality
stated that the state's interest in fair and effective utility regulation
"may justify imposing on [PG&E] the reasonable expenses of
responsible groups that represent the public interest at rate making
proceedings.' 06
In short, the mandatory disclaimer ensured that the respective
views of TURN and PG&E would remain disassociated. PG&E's
supposed compulsion to respond would be attributable solely to the
substance of TURN's message, not to the Commission's action in
granting access. PG&E would have been no more or less compelled
to respond to TURN's inserts than it would have been compelled to
answer TURN's advertisements in other media. This sort of "com-
pulsion" to defend and justify one's views in the "marketplace of
ideas" raises no first amendment problems; indeed, the first
amendment was designed in large part precisely to promote such
compulsion.107 As the plurality correctly observed, there is no consti-
104. See Appendix, supra note 10, at App. A (U.S. filed Dec. 31, 1984). PG&E's bill,
together with occasional legally mandated notices, generally weighed less than one ounce per
envelope. Postage for mailing the bill, however, was assessed in increments of one ounce. The
Commission permitted PG&E to include the cost of postage in the rates collected from
PG&E's ratepayers. As a result, the ratepayers funded more postage than PG&E needed or
used. They paid for the "extra space," or perhaps more accurately the unused weight allow-
ance, in each envelope. See id.
105. Id.
106. PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 913.
107. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377-78 (1984); Red Lion,
395 U.S. at 388-90.
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tutional right "to be free from vigorous debate." '108
E. The Commission's Order Should Have Been Evaluated Under
The "Rational Basis" Standard That is Applied To Routine Regu-
lation Of Corporate Conduct
Since the first amendment recognizes no corporate "freedom of
mind" and, accordingly, no corporate right not to speak, a corpora-
tion's agreement or disagreement with compelled speech should be
insufficient to trigger first amendment analysis.1"9 For the same rea-
son, neither the source of the compelled speech (whether within or
without the corporation) nor the label that might be applied to the
speech were it viewed in isolation (i.e., political, social, commercial,
legal notice) should justify heightened scrutiny of the state's action.
The only reason for according first amendment protection to
corporate speech is to ensure the free flow of information to the pub-
lic.1"' Corporate speech is protected not for its own sake, but for the
sake of its recipients. The recipients' interests are harmed if that
speech is suppressed. The first amendment, therefore, rightly bars
the government from regulating corporations in such a way as to
suppress their political speech or to cause the corporations to censor
their political expression.11' A regulation that compels a corporation
to speak, in and of itself, would not seem to pose any risk of suppres-
sion or self-censorship. Thus, absent a showing that a regulation
compelling corporate speech has a collateral effect of suppressing or
penalizing the corporation's own speech, such regulations should be
analyzed no differently than other instances of state regulation of
corporate conduct. This means that the compulsion should be upheld
by the courts if it "rationally relate[s] to any legitimate end of
government."' "
108. PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 910.
109. See supra note 58.
110. See supra note 72.
111. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. 530; Belotti, 435 U.S. 765; Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (The first
and fourteenth amendments bar states from granting damage awards in civil libel action by
public official against newspaper corporation for publication of advertisement critical of offi-
cial, absent plaintiff's showing of actual malice.).
112. 2 R.D. ROTUNDA, JE. NOWAK, & J.N. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 59 (1986). Accord L.H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 450-51 (1978). Thus, the state may constitutionally compel a corporation to
disclose the legal rights and remedies available to those who conduct business with the corpora-
tion. Such compulsion rationally furthers legitimate governmental ends. While the Justices in
PG&E agreed that the state may compel corporations to disclose legal notices, they offered no
clear explanation for that authority. See PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 911 n.12 (plurality opinion)
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This being the case, the fact that the state's selection of the
speech to be compelled may be content-based should not necessarily
invalidate the compulsion. In fact, if the validity of compulsion turns
on whether the compelled speech rationally relates to a legitimate
state interest, it would be entirely appropriate for the state to con-
sider the content of any speech it proposes to compel a corporation to
disseminate."' Only by so doing could the state determine whether
compulsory dissemination would actually further its interest. Indeed,
it would be irrational for the state not to consider the content of the
speech.
In the PG&E case, as demonstrated above,114 the plurality
failed to justify its conclusion that the Commission's order would
have had a collateral effect of suppressing or penalizing PG&E's
own speech. The plurality failed to demonstrate any link between
the Commission's order and the predicted impact of that order on the
utility's speech. Specifically, the plurality failed to explain how the
order could have resulted in a reduction in the flow of information
from PG&E to its customers. Moreover, the plurality inexplicably
disregarded the fact that all third-party speech to be disseminated by
the utility carried a disclaimer that effectively disassociated PG&E
from that speech. In addition, TURN's access to the billing enve-
lopes was guaranteed and scheduled in advance, thus minimizing the
risk that the utility would censor itself to avoid triggering a response
by TURN.
Accordingly, the order should not have been tested under the
strict "compelling state interest" and "narrowly tailored means"
requirements of the first amendment. Rather, like other regulations
of corporate conduct, the order should have been analyzed under the
more lenient "rational basis" test. Had the plurality applied such a
test, the result may well have been to uphold the Commission's
order.
(The state has "substantial leeway" to compel business corporations to disclose "various legal
notices."); id. at 915 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (State has "compelling" inter-
est in requiring utility to disclose nonpolitical speech that is "directly relevant to commercial
transactions between the ratepayer and the utility."); id. at 923 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (as-
suming, without explanation, that the state may compel the utility to disclose "warnings,"
"provisos," "disclaimers," and "legal notices of public hearings and rate-making
proceedings").
113. Cf Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion)
(Where the city had a legitimate interest in limiting access to advertising space on city-owned
buses to avoid the appearance of political favoritism, the first amendment did not bar the city's
consideration of subject matter of proposed advertisements.).
114. See supra Parts III(C)&(D).
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The state interest served by the order - enhancing the effec-
tiveness of rate making proceedings - was legitimate, as the
plurality seemed to recognize." 5 The more difficult question would
have been whether TURN's message would have furthered that state
interest. The answer would depend on which interpretation of the
order was adopted - that of the plurality or that of Justice Stevens.
The Stevens interpretation was more consistent with the facts." 6
That interpretation would have limited TURN to little more than
fund-raising appeals, and TURN's messages clearly would have fur-
thered the state's interest. On the other hand, the plurality read the
order to impose few, if any, limits on the content of TURN's mes-
sage."' Under this interpretation, whether there would have been a
nexus between TURN's messages and the state's interest could have
been determined only with reference to the specific messages TURN
proposed to have disseminated.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that there is no support in either law or
reason for the premise which underlies the PG&E plurality's analy-
sis. Namely, the plurality erred by assuming that corporations
possess "freedom of mind" under the first amendment. This presup-
position is inconsistent with the Court's stated rationale for affording
protection to corporate speech and with well accepted regulatory
practices. The authorities support the proposition that the first
amendment prohibits compulsion of corporate speech only in cases
where the compulsion has a collateral effect of suppressing or penal-
izing the corporation's expression of its own views. Absent such a
collateral effect, regulations mandating speech by corporations
should be analyzed no differently than other regulations of corporate
behavior. If there is a rational basis for the regulation, i.e., if the
compelled speech furthers a legitimate state interest, the regulation
should be upheld. Had this standard been applied in the PG&E
case, the result may well have been to uphold the Commission's
order.
115, See PG&E, 106 S. Ct. at 913.
116. See supra note 15.
117. See id. and accompanying text.
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